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By William I. Robinson
[Below is part two of a piece based on an address delivered by Robinson at a Feb. 10 symposium
organized by the Central America Peace Alliance, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Part one of this text
which discussed the post-cold war political situation in Central America from a regional perspective
was published in the 02/18/94 edition of NotiSur. In this second part, Robinson analyzes domestic
political developments in three of the isthmian nations: Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
Robinson, a former LADB news analyst, is currently a research associate with the Managua- based
International Studies Center (Centro de Estudios Internacionales, CEI).]
Up to this point, we've discussed general developments throughout the Central American region as
a whole. I would now like to briefly address some specific issues regarding Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua.

Guatemala
As I mentioned earlier, between 1977 and 1994, Guatemala witnessed an acceleration in the
concentration of wealth and resources. According to the last survey of land tenure in Guatemala
conducted by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), fewer that 2% of all
landowners possess more than 65% of the total farmland which constitutes the most highly skewed
land tenure pattern in all of Latin America. Also according to AID, about one-third of the population
lives on farms too small to support a family. And this is the most rural country in all of Latin
America; some 75% of all Guatemalans still live off of the land.
It has been nine months now since then-president Jorge Serrano launched a coup d'etat, attempting
to disband Congress and suspend constitutional rule. The failure of that coup culminated with
assumption of the presidency by former human rights ombudsman Ramiro de Leon. At that time,
there was unprecedented enthusiasm among Guatemalans that real change was finally coming to
the country. In his role as ombudsman, De Leon had earned widespread respect for confronting
those guilty of violating human rights.
Above all, three aspects of De Leon's program for Guatemala stand out. First is developing solid
working relations with the nation's powerful military establishment. From the outset, De Leon
has made it very clear that he is not going to challenge military power in Guatemala even if this
means turning a blind eye to military impunity and human rights violations. In fact, human rights
violations decreased during the first two months of De Leon's presidency, but since then the
frequency of abuses has shot back up to levels even higher than during the Serrano administration.
In mid-December of 1993, Monica Pinto, a representative of the UN Human Rights Commission
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conducted a 12-day visit to Guatemala. Upon culmination of the visit, Pinto gave her preliminary
report. In the report, Pinto condemned the new Guatemalan government for refusing to comply
with UN recommendations to disband the Civil Defense Patrols (PAC) and to dismantle the Estado
Mayor Presidencial (Presidential Security Staff), the military's chief instrument for controlling the
civilian presidency.
The UN report also criticizes De Leon for refusing to end forced military recruitment and for
continuing to turn a blind eye to repression against the indigenous population. Quoting from
Monica Pinto's report, "the army is present in every nook and cranny of the country's institutional,
social, political, and economic life."
The second plank of De Leon's program has to do with economic policy. There has been no reversal,
or even minor modification, of the neoliberal program. This is ironic, since in 1990 the same Ramiro
De Leon, when he was still human rights ombudsman, delivered a major speech on behalf of
Guatemala during a meeting in Mexico of the Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM). In his
speech, De Leon condemned both neoliberalism as well as militarism in Guatemala, declaring that
"these are contrary to God's project on earth." Today, as President of Guatemala, Ramiro de Leon is
implementing neoliberalism and closing his eyes to militarism.
Plank three of his program is negotiations with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union
(URNG). Upon assuming the presidency, De Leon declared that negotiations and a peace settlement
with the URNG did not constitute a high priority for his administration. Under heavy national and
international pressure, he was forced to backtrack from that position. In October 1993, he came
out with a "peace proposal" which basically called for the unconditional surrender of the URNG.
There was a huge outcry both inside the country and abroad, forcing De Leon to ditch the proposal.
Instead, government representatives met with the URNG in early January and agreed to restart the
peace process on the basis of the negotiations agenda which had been worked out during peace
talks under the Serrano administration. The next round of the dialogue is set to take place during
the first half of March, when the two sides will discuss a human rights accord.
I'd like to also mention briefly a couple of points on the possible effects of the Chiapas rebellion on
the Guatemalan insurgency. First, the southern border region of Mexico has become much more
militarized than it was prior to explosion of the Chiapas conflict. Thus the conflict in Chiapas will
probably force the URNG, which has traditionally counted on a sanctuary and rearguard in southern
Mexico, back into Guatemala, thus intensifying the armed conflict in Guatemala. Second, President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari's administration is probably going to exert considerable pressure on both
the Guatemalan government and the URNG to reach a peace accord in the short term.

Honduras
In neighboring Honduras, former president Rafael Callejas launched a neoliberal structural
adjustment program in early 1990. The program has achieved some macroeconomic stability, but
has largely failed to generate significant levels of investment or economic growth. And, as in other
countries where this type of program has been applied, the cost has been an unprecedented increase
in poverty. During just the first two years of the program, poverty rates increased from 68% of the
total population to 78%. The increase in poverty has been accompanied by a marked decline in
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health indicators. For example, it is estimated that over 12,000 Honduran children die each year,
an average of 33 per day, from preventable illnesses. Meanwhile, in the countryside, the so-called
Law of Agricultural Modernization approved under the Callejas administration is accelerating
the agricultural sector into a pattern of concentrated, large-scale capitalist production. This is
undermining a sizable small and medium peasantry that had benefitted in the 1960s and 1970s from
a mild, but significant, agrarian reform program.
The Honduran countryside is fast becoming a tinderbox, approaching the dimensions of Guatemala.
Honduras held general elections late last year, with the opposition Liberal Party and its presidential
candidate Carlos Roberto Reina winning by a huge margin of votes. The electoral results were
widely interpreted as a repudiation of the economic program, since Reina's chief opponent,
Callejas's colleague Oswaldo Ramos Soto, had campaigned on the neoliberal program's "successes."
For his part, Reina has promised to pay more attention to the needs of the poor. In Reina's own
words, his greatest achievement as President will be "preventing an increase in the number of
people living in poverty and ensuring that their current situation doesn't deteriorate." But at
the same time, he has made it clear he will not abandon the neoliberal project outright. This is a
contradiction in terms. Reina's economic advisors have to date offered little in the way of concrete
proposals as to how they plan to fight massive poverty and unemployment while leaving the core of
the previous government's economic program in place.
Reina has also found himself between a rock and a hard place in terms of military reform. Having
promised during his campaign to curb human rights abuses by the powerful armed forces, to
suspend forced military recruitment, and to reduce defense spending, Reina will likely see his
popularity among the electorate begin to slide if he backs off from these commitments. At the same
time, however, the Honduran military has traditionally resisted all attempts to whittle away at its
autonomy. In fact, Reina has already run into stiff opposition from the army in his initial attempts
to eliminate the practice of forced military recruitment. Last year, there was a virtual civic uprising
against military domination and bringing the powerful armed forces under some degree of civilian
control was for the first time thrust onto the national agenda in Honduras. These mass pressures led
to promises that the dreaded National Investigations Directorate (DNI) would be dismantled and
replaced by a civilian unit, the Criminal Investigation Directorate (DIC).
Since then, it has become clear that the DNI is simply being transferred, nearly intact, to the new
unit. The same officers and the same structures will simply be operating under a figurehead civilian
leadership. This does not constitute a serious challenge to military power and impunity. Contrary
to the expectations at that time, there has been no movement toward dissolution of FUSEP, the
militarized police. The most recent report on Honduras by Americas Watch, released in late 1993,
indicates that systematic human rights violations continue in that country, and that only minimal
inroads have been made against military impunity.

Nicaragua
In the case of Nicaragua, I would first say that the goals of the anti-Sandinista forces which came
to power in 1990 and the goals pursued by the United States in Nicaragua- -are very clear, and
they haven't significantly changed since 1990. The first of these goals is to dismantle the revolution.
Second is to reconstitute an elitist social order in the country. Third is to recover traditional US
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hegemony over the country. And fourth is to recreate the conditions through the neoliberal
structural adjustment program to allow for a renewed process of capital accumulation. This is
the Clinton administration's project for Nicaragua, as it was the Bush administration's, and will
probably continue to be the US project throughout the 1990s. It is a long-term project which I would
characterize as a "slow motion counterrevolution."
The principal dynamic for understanding Nicaragua in the 1990s is the interplay of this slow motion
counterrevolution, on the one side, and the reorganization and redefinition of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the popular sectors on the other side. The process of
dismantling the revolution, reconstructing a powerful propertied class, and reconstituting an elitist
social order, has progressed significantly during the past four years.
Economically, the majority of Nicaraguans have never been worse off than they are today, not even
during the Somoza dictatorship and not even during the worst years of war and economic crisis
during the Sandinista government. Currently, four out of every five Nicaraguans live below the
poverty line. Nearly 70% of the country's economically active population is unemployed. Heath care
and education, at one time a hallmark of the revolution, are on a fast-track process of privatization,
well on the road to once again becoming privileges for the wealthy. Illiteracy, which had been
reduced following the Sandinista literacy campaign to just 12% of the population has now shot
back up to at least 30% and will probably continue to rise sharply, since the new generation of postrevolutionary children will not be able to afford education.
In the early 1980s, under the revolutionary government, the infant mortality rate had been reduced
to under 50 per 1,000 births. By 1991, it was up to 71 per 1,000 births, and by 1993 it was up to 83
per 1,000 births, the highest rate in Central America and one of the highest in all of Latin America.
Of all deaths among children, 40% are attributed to diarrhea and another 35% to a lack of basic
nutrients, such as iron, iodine, or vitamin A. So it is not a question of infectious diseases, this is
death from poverty, plain and simple. In the short space of four years, several powerful financial
groups have consolidated their hold over the country's economy, thanks in part to judicious use
of the US economic aid package and the different types of political intervention Washington has
been conducting. By the end of 1993, nine large capitalist groups had been fully consolidated. These
nine groups received 30% of the country's financial allocations, while 28,000 small-scale agricultural
producers most of whom received their land under the Sandinista agrarian reform program had no
access whatsoever to credit and were therefore unable to produce. As a result, with each passing
month, more and more poor families in the countryside are being forced to sell their holdings in
order to survive.
So we have this alarming process of reconcentration of property holdings, and along with it
economic and political muscle, in the hands of a reconstituted Nicaraguan elite. Against this
backdrop, Nicaragua has entered 1994, a key year for the country. First, general elections are coming
up in 1996, and the country is now immersed in a pre-electoral atmosphere with the different
political forces jockeying for position ahead of the actual process of alliance formation, candidate
selection, and platform drafting. In May, the FSLN will be holding an extra-ordinary party congress.
During the congress, the Sandinistas will be overhauling the party structures, electing a new
leadership, and drafting a new party program. It is expected that during this congress, the long©2011 The University of New Mexico,
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postponed redefinition of the Sandinista movement will finally take place. At the same time, there
has been a new realignment of political forces inside the country around an agreement to break
the impasse which has paralyzed the legislature for the past 16 months, to approve a package of
constitutional reforms, and to seek a minimum degree of political stability in the country. All this
will be playing itself out during the next few months. And finally, the popular forces in civil society
are more belligerent than ever, seeking their own alternatives and initiatives.
There has been a remarkable reproachment and dialogue at the grassroots level even as disputes
continue on a daily basis at the leadership level. With regard to the situation in the FSLN, there
are currently strong debates going on over two essential issues. Some have gone so far as to
characterize the situation as a major crisis, in which the FSLN is dividing into two separate camps.
In the first instance, the debate is over a series of tactical issues related to forms of popular struggle.
Second, there is debate over the strategic issue of what type of popular project there should be for
Nicaragua. In essence, two groups have emerged within the party. One is referred to as the "Group
of 29," the name coming from a political statement signed by 29 influential party leaders last year.
This group, which is associated with former president Daniel Ortega, calls at the tactical level for
mass, popular mobilizations as the principal form of struggle. An example of this would be the
transportation strike which paralyzed the country in September of last year. At the strategic level,
the Group of 29 is arguing for total rejection of the neoliberal project.
The second group is led by former vice president Sergio Ramirez and is to some degree identified
with current army chief Gen. Humberto Ortega, as well as with the FSLN's "Center Group" of
political moderates and social democrats. Tactically, this group argues that formal democratic
procedures and the rule of law must be rigorously adhered to. They characterize the installation
of formal democracy as the most important historic achievement to come out of the defeat of the
Somoza dictatorship. As a practical matter, this means that struggles should take place in the
parliament, through elections, and so forth, not through mass mobilizations. Strategically, they
argue that there is no real alternative at this time to the neoliberal project. All of this has led the
second group to adopt a position of critical support for the Chamorro government and its neoliberal
project.
Despite the strategic and tactical differences which separate these two camps which is something
that will clearly be confronted during the upcoming party congress the FSLN remains the principal
political force in the country, counting on the solid support of some 20% to 25% of the population.
The other up and coming political force is Managua Mayor Arnoldo Aleman, leader of the Liberal
Constitutionalist Party (PLC). Aleman is attempting to unite all Nicaraguan Liberal factions under
a single umbrella. Through control over city hall, he has also been adroit at employing US aid
funds and other monies to create a patronage network. Aleman's project ultimately amounts to a
resurrected and updated "Somocismo" for the 1990s.
In addition to Aleman's efforts to unite the four or five Liberal factions, there has also been some
movement toward formation of a broader right-wing alliance which would bring together the
Liberals, several factions of Conservatives, and former contras from the Nicaraguan Resistance Party
(PRN). Publicly, this coalition-building effort is being spearheaded by Adolfo Calero, a hardliner
in the contra army's civilian directorate during the 1980s. Another important political force is the
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centrist grouping of Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties which came together last
year to form the Christian Democrat Union (UDC).
In the recent political realignment in the legislature, the UDC's Luis Humberto Guzman was elected
president of the parliament, further bolstering the UDC's possibilities of projecting itself as an
important political force during 1994. All of these developments have further weakened and isolated
the National Opposition Union (UNO) coalition which catapulted President Chamorro to power
four years ago. From the 15 parties which originally comprised the alliance, UNO now counts on the
allegiance of just a handful of leaders representing factions of five parties, including the Socialist
and Communist parties. How many candidates will run in the elections, and which of the above
forces will eventually coalesce into solid electoral coalitions, are questions which will be answered
during the remainder of this year and into next year.

-- End --
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